2020 to today · Surveillance & Privacy

Salt Typhoon: How Chinese Hackers Used Congressionally Mandated Wiretap Backdoors Inside US Phone Carriers

Period covered: 1994 to 2025 · 11 sources

Summary

In 1994 Congress required the phone companies to build interception into their networks so the government could listen with a court order. On November 13, 2024 the FBI confirmed that hackers affiliated with the Chinese government had been inside American carriers, had taken customer call records, had read and listened to the communications of people in government and politics, and had copied information from the systems that handle the government's own wiretap orders. By December a ninth carrier had been named. The government's advice to the public was to use encryption, which the FBI had spent a decade telling Congress was a danger. In January 2025 the FCC ruled that the 1994 law obliged carriers to secure their networks. In November 2025 it rescinded the ruling, 2 to 1.

The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act was passed in 1994. The Federal Communications Commission describes its purpose as preserving the ability of law enforcement agencies to conduct electronic surveillance while protecting the privacy of information outside the scope of the investigation. It requires the phone companies to design their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that they have the necessary surveillance capabilities to comply with legal requests for information. In plain terms, every carrier in the country was ordered to build a door into its network that the government could open with a court order.

The bureau and the lock

For years the FBI told Congress that the door was not enough. On October 16, 2014 its director, James Comey, gave a speech at the Brookings Institution titled Going Dark. The 1994 law, he said, was enacted 20 years ago, a lifetime in the Internet age, and it doesn't cover new means of communication. We have the legal authority to intercept and access communications and information pursuant to court order, he said, but we often lack the technical ability to do so. Encryption, he said, threatens to lead all of us to a very dark place. He asked for assistance and cooperation from companies to comply with lawful court orders. The bureau's position for the next decade was that communications the government could not read were a public danger.

What was found

On November 13, 2024 the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency issued a joint statement. The government's investigation, it said, has revealed a broad and significant cyber espionage campaign. Specifically, we have identified that PRC-affiliated actors have compromised networks at multiple telecommunications companies to enable the theft of customer call records data, the compromise of private communications of a limited number of individuals who are primarily involved in government or political activity, and the copying of certain information that was subject to U.S. law enforcement requests pursuant to court orders. The last item is the wiretap system. The operation was given the name Salt Typhoon.

Senator Charles Grassley wrote to the Justice Department and the FBI on December 18, 2024. The carriers named in the reporting he cited were AT&T, Verizon, Lumen, and T-Mobile. The material taken included audio from phone calls and unencrypted communications including text messages, and among the phones targeted were those of Donald Trump, J.D. Vance, and members of the Harris campaign, along with the system the federal government uses for court-authorized network wiretapping requests. Grassley wrote that Verizon's representatives had told his office the FBI told them that Verizon should avoid disclosure of information regarding the incident, and that AT&T's had said the FBI told them to direct certain congressional inquiries to the FBI instead of responding to Congress. He called that obstruction. On December 27, 2024 the deputy national security adviser, Anne Neuberger, said a ninth carrier had been found compromised, that officials did not know how many Americans' records were taken, that a large number of them were in the Washington and Virginia area, and that the aim had been to identify who owned the phones and to target people in government. She said voluntary cyber security practices are inadequate to protect against China, Russia and Iran hacking of our critical infrastructure.

The advice

On December 4, 2024 the FBI and CISA held a briefing for reporters. The hackers, officials said, were still inside the carriers' networks, and the companies could not say when they would be out. The government's recommendation to the public was to use end-to-end encrypted messaging and calling. Encryption is your friend, a CISA official said, whether it's on text messaging or if you have the capacity to use encrypted voice communication. The bureau that had spent ten years asking for a way through encryption was now asking the public to use it, because the door it had asked for had been used by someone else.

The rule, and the repeal

On December 5, 2024 the chairwoman of the FCC, Jessica Rosenworcel, circulated a fact sheet. Foreign state-sponsored actors, it said, had infiltrated at least eight U.S. communications companies. She proposed a ruling that section 105 of the 1994 law, which requires carriers to keep their interception capability from being used without lawful authorization, obliges them to secure their networks against unlawful access and interception, and a rule requiring every carrier to create, update, and implement a cybersecurity risk management plan and certify it to the commission every year. The commission adopted the ruling on January 15, 2025 and released it the next day, five days before the administration changed.

On November 20, 2025 the commission, now chaired by Brendan Carr, rescinded it. Carr and Commissioner Olivia Trusty voted to rescind; Commissioner Anna Gomez dissented. The commission's statement called the January ruling unlawful and ineffective, said its legal analysis was flawed, and said the carriers had demonstrated a strengthened cybersecurity posture following Salt Typhoon and had agreed to undertake extensive, urgent, and coordinated efforts to mitigate operational risks. In the order published in the Federal Register it wrote that the ruling had been an ill-advised, rushed effort to take a controversial action without being grounded in a proper notice-and-comment process. Gomez said the reversal will leave Americans less protected than they were the day the Salt Typhoon breach was discovered. Two days earlier the ranking member of the Senate Commerce Committee, Maria Cantwell, had written to Carr that the operation had reached at least 200 American organizations and 80 countries, that the hackers had been able to geolocate millions of individuals and record phone calls at will, and that dropping the requirements was part of a pattern of weakness on national security issues.

← 2020 to today

Primary Sources (11)

Documents, court filings, official reports, and broadcasts cited in this report.

Federal Communications Commission. The 1994 law's purpose and the requirement that carriers design their equipment, facilities, and services to have surveillance capabilities built in.
2014
Federal Bureau of Investigation (speech by Director James Comey at the Brookings Institution). CALEA doesn't cover new means of communication; the legal authority without the technical ability; encryption threatens to lead all of us to a very dark place.
2024
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Theft of customer call records data, compromise of private communications of people in government or political activity, copying of information subject to law enforcement requests pursuant to court orders.
2024
TechCrunch. Encryption is your friend. The hackers still inside the networks with no date for their removal.
2024
Federal Communications Commission. At least eight companies infiltrated; the section 105 declaratory ruling and the annual certification proposal.
2024
Office of Senator Charles Grassley. The carriers, the phones targeted, the court-authorized wiretapping system, and the FBI's guidance to Verizon and AT&T on congressional inquiries.
2024
PBS News (Associated Press). Neuberger: a ninth carrier, a large number of Americans in the Washington and Virginia area, voluntary practices inadequate.
2025
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. At least 200 organizations and 80 countries; geolocate millions and record calls at will; a pattern of weakness on national security issues.
2025
Federal Communications Commission. Carr and Trusty for, Gomez dissenting; the ruling called unlawful and ineffective; the carriers' voluntary commitments.
2025
CSO. Gomez: less protected than they were the day the Salt Typhoon breach was discovered.
2025
Federal Register (Federal Communications Commission). The January 15, 2025 ruling adopted and the November 20, 2025 rescission; the commission's reasons.

Documented Records (1)

Chronological entries extracted from the primary sources above.

2024
November 13, 2024 to November 20, 2025
The FBI confirmed that hackers affiliated with China had compromised at least nine carriers, taken customer call records, read the communications of people in government and politics, and copied information from the systems that handle court-ordered wiretaps, the capability Congress ordered built in 1994. The government told the public to use encryption. The FCC ruled in January 2025 that the 1994 law required carriers to secure their networks, and rescinded the ruling in November 2025, 2 to 1.
“The theft of customer call records data, the compromise of private communications of a limited number of individuals who are primarily involved in government or political activity, and the copying of certain information that was subject to U.S. law enforcement requests pursuant to court orders.”
The carriers; the FBI; the Federal Communications Commission. Violates: The duty to secure what the law forced the carriers to build. The rule requiring it withdrawn.. Source: Joint Statement from FBI and CISA on the People's Republic of China Targeting of Commercial Telecommunications Infrastructure, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Timeline Events (6)

Dated events from this investigation in the site timeline.

November 20, 2025
FCC rescinds the network security ruling, 2 to 1
Gomez: less protected than the day the breach was discovered.
January 15, 2025
FCC rules the 1994 law requires carriers to secure their networks
Rescinded November 20, 2025.
December 4, 2024
Government advice after the hack: encryption is your friend
The hackers still inside the networks.
November 13, 2024
FBI confirms Salt Typhoon: call records, private communications, and the wiretap system
At least eight carriers, then nine.
October 16, 2014
FBI director: encryption leads to a very dark place
The bureau asks for a way through it.
1994
Congress orders the carriers to build wiretap capability into their networks
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.
Salt Typhoon: How Chinese Hackers Used Congressionally Mandated Wiretap Backdoors Inside US Phone Carriers | Spirit of '76