2001 to 2012: After September 11 · Wall Street & Banking
How Wall Street Sold Toxic Derivatives to Cities, Counties, and European Governments
Period covered: 1996 to 2012 · 1 source
Summary
After 2008 the banks kept paying themselves. Part four of FRONTLINE's series follows the derivatives business out of New York and into the places that bought what it sold: a town outside Rome, Jefferson County, Alabama, which went bankrupt after JP Morgan's banker paid bribes, and Greece, whose books Goldman Sachs helped dress for the eurozone. Bad swaps cost American taxpayers $20 billion in five years.
At Christmas 2011, It had been a bad year for the banks' stocks, and the New York banks set aside $20 billion in bonuses anyway. Since the crash of 2008 they had paid out more than $80 billion.
The people who did the work
John Fullerton, a former banker, said the shift came when banks started trading for their own account instead of for customers, and that the culture became a cult of more. Cathy O'Neil, a mathematician who came to the hedge fund D.E. Shaw from MIT, built models to predict when large pension funds would buy or sell so the firm could trade ahead of them. She said she felt she was taking advantage of people she had never met whose retirements were in those funds, and that Wall Street skims a percentage off everyone's 401(k) every quarter. Caitlin Kline, a math major who had considered teaching, said everybody knew in their heart something was not right, and that once you are making money you do not want to stop. Alexis Goldstein, who wrote trading software at Deutsche Bank and Merrill Lynch, described the incentive: make as much as you can this year, and if it blows up three years from now, that does not touch the bonus you already got.
A young trader at a large bank made about $150,000 a year. A star trader could reach $4 million to $10 million after a decade. For most of the last century bankers earned what lawyers, doctors, and engineers earned, and the last time Wall Street paid like this was in the run up to 1929. After the Depression the banks were regulated into what Simon Johnson called plain vanilla business, taking deposits and lending them out, boring and profitable and about knowing who in the community was a good credit. That ended in the late 1990s when Glass-Steagall was repealed and commercial banks could merge with trading houses. Trading grew to three, four, five times the size of the banking side, and the banks began hiring engineers and scientists at double, triple, and five times what any other field paid.
Derivatives were where the money was: about two thirds of trading revenue, according to one banker. A derivative can be invented on the trading floor and sold the next day. On the floor there was a phrase, ripping someone's face off, for selling a client something the client did not understand and charging a large fee for it. Being antagonistic to the client was considered good for the bank. And because the key risk taking was often done in London, it was outside the reach of American regulators. Desiree Fixler, who sold derivatives for Deutsche Bank and JP Morgan there, said the bankers pricing the structures were called F9 monkeys, after the key that produced the price, and that the sales teams fanned out across Europe finding clients who did not understand the product. Nobody knows how many deals were done. They are confidential, and they come to light when they go wrong.
Cassino
In 2003 bankers from Bear Stearns arrived at the city hall of Cassino, a small town an hour south of Rome, and offered to cut its borrowing cost from about 5 percent to 1 or 2 percent if the town entered an interest rate swap. The rate the deal was tied to rose. The town ended up paying Bear Stearns more than a million dollars in interest, sued, and settled for half a million, still in the red. A former councilman said the officials had very little understanding of what they signed. Jamie Dimon, whose bank bought Bear Stearns in 2008, told FRONTLINE that JP Morgan would not have done those deals, that he holds banks responsible for leading unsophisticated municipal officials down the wrong path, and that when large bonuses are on the table the incentive to cheat is very high. More than 1,000 municipalities and institutions across Europe entered similar deals with Merrill Lynch, UBS, Deutsche Bank, and others, with potential losses in the billions.
Jefferson County
In 1996 Jefferson County, Alabama, which includes Birmingham, spent $2 billion on a sewer system that left residents with bills that tripled. In 2002 the county set out to refinance $3 billion in sewer debt, and the size of the deal got Wall Street's attention. Charles LeCroy of JP Morgan, said to be the bank's largest profit center for several years running, pitched interest rate swaps to the county commissioner in charge of finances, Larry Langford, a former television reporter with no knowledge of swaps or the markets. Langford consulted a friend, the Birmingham financial adviser Bill Blount, who told him it was a good deal. The county swapped variable rates to fixed and fixed back to variable, again and again, betting on where rates would go.
In 2008 the bets went wrong and the county owed hundreds of millions in fees and penalties, including to JP Morgan. Federal prosecutors found that LeCroy had paid $3 million from JP Morgan to Blount, who passed money and gifts to Langford. Langford was convicted of bribery and fraud in 2010 and sentenced to fifteen years. Blount cooperated and got four and a half years. JP Morgan settled with the SEC for $25 million and was ordered to forgive $697 million in fees owed by the county. LeCroy was sentenced to three months in a similar case in Philadelphia. In November 2011 Jefferson County filed the largest municipal bankruptcy in American history. More than a hundred school districts and hospitals and scores of state and local governments across the country bought interest rate swaps, and in the five years after the crash the bad ones cost American taxpayers $20 billion.
Greece
On Wall Street the derivatives business is sometimes called the solutions business, and in the 1990s the biggest problems were in Europe, where countries had to meet statistical targets to join the euro. Bankers spotted an area that was dull, important, and unwatched. The film's interviewees describe what they did as regulatory arbitrage: a legal structure that gets around the spirit of a rule, and the more of it you did the more you were paid. France reclassified its pension obligations. Germany used gold transactions. Italy did a currency swap with JP Morgan that had a loan built into it and did not appear on its financial statements, and was admitted to the eurozone in 1999. The JP Morgan banker who ran it said it lowered the deficit and that nothing was hidden from Italy's partners.
In 2003 the journalist Nick Dunbar reported that Goldman Sachs had sold Greece giant swaps that cut its reported debt by about 2 percent, a secret off balance sheet loan at an effective rate of about 16 percent a year, on which Goldman earned hundreds of millions. Nothing happened. Fixler said the reaction inside JP Morgan was not shock but a question: how did you miss this, and can we replicate it. Banks then lent to Greece at close to German rates, its debt doubled between 2001 and 2008, and a former Greek official said the governments pretended to keep their finances in order and their European partners pretended to believe them. One interviewee who had dealt with the European statistics agency said it knew about the big tricks, because he had talked to its officials, and did not care. In 2009 the new government found a deficit twice what had been reported and six times what had been planned, the bond traders who had fueled the borrowing dumped the bonds, and the crisis spread to Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain.
Back in Washington
Since 2007 the five largest American banks had grown larger and held assets equal to 56 percent of the American economy, and the film's interviewees said they were the obvious conduit for a European shock. Since Dodd-Frank the twelve agencies writing its rules had been in a deadlock with the bank lobby, which had spent more than $320 million. The Volcker rule, meant to restore the separation of proprietary trading from customer banking, had grown from 10 pages to almost 300 of exemptions. Former traders working with Occupy Wall Street read the draft, worked out how they would get around it if they were still at a bank, and filed their comments with the regulators, since the only people who normally comment on a rule are the industry about to be regulated. When the government tried to apply tougher rules to banks trading more than $100 million in swaps a year, the lobby got the threshold raised to $8 billion, leaving 85 percent of derivatives players outside oversight.
One of the former traders said banks were reformed after the Great Depression, that it was a matter of political will then and still is, and that the bar is not perfection but something better than this. A regulator in the documentary said his hope is that the country learns the lessons of 2008 the way it learned the lessons of 1929, and that it may take several more crises.
Primary Sources (1)
Documents, court filings, official reports, and broadcasts cited in this report.
Documented Records (3)
Chronological entries extracted from the primary sources above.
Timeline Events (1)
Dated events from this investigation in the site timeline.
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