2013 to 2019: The disclosures · Wall Street & Banking

Why Only One Wall Street Executive Went to Prison After the 2008 Mortgage Fraud Crisis

Period covered: 2004 to 2014 · 10 sources

Summary

The FBI warned Congress in 2004 that mortgage fraud was pervasive and growing and could do as much damage as the savings and loan crisis, which had produced more than 800 convictions. The government's own inquiry into the 2008 crisis found lenders made loans they knew borrowers could not afford and a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics. The banks then paid $13 billion and $16.65 billion to settle civil claims in which they admitted selling securities they knew did not meet their own guidelines. One Wall Street executive went to prison, for 30 months. In 2013 the attorney general told the Senate that some institutions had become so large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute them. In 2012 his department had let a bank that admitted laundering money for drug cartels pay a fine instead of facing a charge.

On September 17, 2004 the assistant director of the FBI's criminal division, Chris Swecker, told reporters that mortgage fraud had the potential to be an epidemic, and that we think we can prevent a problem that could have as much impact as the S&L crisis. Three weeks later he told a House subcommittee that mortgage fraud is pervasive and growing. The savings and loan crisis he was comparing it to had produced, by Judge Jed Rakoff's count, successful prosecutions of more than 800 people.

What the inquiry found

Congress created the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission to find out what had happened. Its report, in January 2011, concluded that this financial crisis was avoidable, that it was the result of human action and inaction, not of Mother Nature or computer models gone haywire, that dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions were a key cause of this crisis, that lenders made loans that they knew borrowers could not afford and that could cause massive losses to investors in mortgage securities, and that there was a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics. Rakoff counted the word fraud and its variants in the report: no fewer than 157 times.

What the banks admitted

On November 19, 2013 JPMorgan Chase agreed to pay $13 billion, then the largest settlement with a single entity in American history, $9 billion in payments and $4 billion in relief to borrowers. In the statement of facts it acknowledged that it regularly represented to RMBS investors that the mortgage loans in various securities complied with underwriting guidelines while its employees knew that the loans in question did not comply with those guidelines and were not otherwise appropriate for securitization, and sold them anyway. On August 21, 2014 Bank of America agreed to pay $16.65 billion, the new record, and acknowledged with Countrywide and Merrill Lynch that they had sold billions of dollars of RMBS without disclosing to investors key facts about the quality of the securitized loans, had made misrepresentations about the quality of those loans, and had used shadow guidelines that let in borrowers the official standards excluded. Both settlements said in writing that they did not release any individual from criminal prosecution. No executive of either bank was charged.

The one who went

Kareem Serageldin had been the global head of structured credit at Credit Suisse. On November 22, 2013 he was sentenced to 30 months in prison for conspiring to falsify the bank's books by inflating the value of mortgage bonds by more than $100 million in 2007. By the account of the reporter who covered it for the New York Times Magazine, he was the only Wall Street executive sent to prison for his part in the crisis, and the judge who sentenced him said his conduct was a small piece of an overall evil climate within the bank and with many other banks.

Too big

On December 11, 2012 the Justice Department announced that HSBC would pay $1.92 billion, the most a bank had ever paid the government, and admitted that it had let Mexican drug cartels launder money through it and had let Iran, Cuba, Libya, Sudan, and Burma do business in the United States in violation of sanctions. The head of the criminal division, Lanny Breuer, called the bank's record of dysfunction simply astonishing. There was no criminal charge. Asked why, Breuer said: you look at the collateral consequences, so it's certainly a factor, and explained that taking away the bank's license to operate in the United States would have cost jobs and damaged the economy. On March 6, 2013 the attorney general, Eric Holder, told the Senate Judiciary Committee: I am concerned that the size of some of these institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute them. It has an inhibiting impact on our ability to bring resolutions that I think would be more appropriate. Judge Rakoff, a federal judge in Manhattan, listed the department's reasons in January 2014: that intent was hard to prove against executives far from the loan desks, that the buyers of the securities were sophisticated counterparties who should have known better, and that a prosecution might have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.

← 2013 to 2019

Primary Sources (10)

Documents, court filings, official reports, and broadcasts cited in this report.

2004
CNN. Swecker: it has the potential to be an epidemic; we think we can prevent a problem that could have as much impact as the S&L crisis.
2011
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. The crisis was avoidable; dramatic failures of corporate governance; lenders made loans they knew borrowers could not afford; a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics.
2012
NPR. $1.92 billion; laundering for cartels and sanctions violations admitted; Breuer on collateral consequences; no criminal charge.
2013
PBS Frontline. The size of some of these institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute them.
2013
U.S. Department of Justice. $9 billion in payments, $4 billion in relief; the statement of facts; no release of individuals from criminal prosecution.
2013
U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York. Conspiracy to falsify books and records; more than $100 million in inflated valuations in 2007.
2014
The New York Review of Books (Judge Jed S. Rakoff). More than 800 prosecuted after the savings and loan crisis; fraud in the commission's report no fewer than 157 times; the department's three excuses.
2014
3 Quarks Daily (excerpting Jesse Eisinger, The New York Times Magazine). Serageldin the only Wall Street executive sent to jail for his part in the crisis; the judge's overall evil climate remark.
2014
U.S. Department of Justice. $5 billion penalty, $7 billion relief; the admissions on securitized loans and shadow guidelines; no release of individuals.

Documented Records (1)

Chronological entries extracted from the primary sources above.

2013
2004 to 2014
The FBI warned in 2004 that mortgage fraud could match the savings and loan crisis, which had produced more than 800 convictions. The government's inquiry found lenders made loans they knew borrowers could not afford and a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics. JPMorgan and Bank of America paid $13 billion and $16.65 billion and admitted in writing that they sold securities they knew did not meet their guidelines. One executive went to prison, for 30 months. The attorney general told the Senate that some institutions had become so large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute them.
“I am concerned that the size of some of these institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute them.”
Department of Justice; the banks. Violates: Equal application of the law to the financial industry. One conviction.. Source: Holder: Big Banks' Clout 'Has an Inhibiting Impact' on Prosecutions, PBS Frontline

Timeline Events (6)

Dated events from this investigation in the site timeline.

August 21, 2014
Bank of America pays $16.65 billion and admits the loans were misrepresented
No executive charged.
November 22, 2013
The one Wall Street executive sent to prison for the crisis: 30 months
Three days after JPMorgan's $13 billion settlement released no one from prosecution.
March 6, 2013
Holder: some institutions so large it is difficult to prosecute them
To the Senate Judiciary Committee.
December 11, 2012
HSBC admits laundering for cartels and pays $1.92 billion; no charge
Breuer: you look at the collateral consequences.
January 27, 2011
Crisis commission: the crisis was avoidable; lenders knew borrowers could not pay
A systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics.
September 17, 2004
FBI: mortgage fraud has the potential to be an epidemic
As much impact as the S&L crisis, which produced more than 800 convictions.
Why Only One Wall Street Executive Went to Prison After the 2008 Mortgage Fraud Crisis | Spirit of '76