1975 to 2000: Investigations and deregulation · Wall Street & Banking

The 2000 Commodity Futures Modernization Act That Deregulated Credit Default Swaps

Period covered: December 21, 2000 · 2 sources

Summary

In 1998 the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission proposed regulating the private derivatives market. The Treasury secretary, the Fed chairman, and the SEC chairman moved to stop her. In December 2000 Congress attached the Commodity Futures Modernization Act to an 11,000 page spending bill and passed it in a day. It exempted swaps from regulation, and eight years later the swaps took down AIG.

A derivative is a contract whose value depends on something else, an interest rate, a currency, a loan, a price. Futures on farm crops had traded on regulated exchanges in Chicago for over a century, with public prices, capital requirements, and a regulator, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The credit default swaps invented at JP Morgan in the 1990s were a different thing. They traded privately, bank to bank, with no exchange, no published price, and no reserve requirement, and the market was doubling every year.

The warning

In 1998 Brooksley Born, the chairman of the CFTC, issued a concept release, a document asking whether the private derivatives market should come under her agency's oversight. She said her agency was the one that had been given the authority over derivatives, and that without transparency and regulation the risk would build until it caused a crisis and a taxpayer bailout. In FRONTLINE's account, the banks lobbied hard against any regulation because they did not want to have to put the risk on their balance sheets, and the Federal Reserve chairman, Alan Greenspan, told Congress that regulation of derivatives negotiated privately between professionals was unnecessary. The Treasury secretary, Robert Rubin, his deputy Larry Summers, and the SEC chairman, Arthur Levitt, joined Greenspan in asking Congress to block her. Congress put a moratorium on the CFTC acting, and Born left the agency in 1999. That same year the four men's working group recommended that swaps be excluded from regulation by law.

What the Law Provided

The recommendation became the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, H.R. 5660 of the 106th Congress, sponsored by Congressman Thomas Ewing of Illinois with Senator Phil Gramm of Texas as its champion in the Senate. On December 15, 2000, in the last days of a lame duck session, its 262 pages were attached to the omnibus appropriations bill that funded the government, a measure of more than 11,000 pages. The House passed the package that day 292 to 60. The Senate passed it by unanimous consent the same day. President Clinton signed it on December 21, 2000. There was no debate on the derivatives provisions.

The act provided that over the counter derivatives between sophisticated parties were not subject to the Commodity Exchange Act, which meant the CFTC could not regulate them, and it provided that they were not securities, which meant the SEC could not either. It also preempted state gaming and bucket shop laws, which had been the last legal argument that a bet on a price movement, made by someone with no interest in the underlying thing, was gambling. A separate provision, written for Enron, exempted energy trading on electronic platforms from oversight; Enron collapsed the following year.

Key Provisions of the Act

With the law in place, in FRONTLINE's words, the derivatives market went into darkness. By the end of 2005 the outstanding value of credit default swaps was in the trillions of dollars and doubling each year. AIG, an insurance company, wrote $440 billion of them without the reserves an insurer would have been required to hold against any other kind of policy, and nobody outside knew, because the law required no disclosure. When the mortgages the swaps referenced failed in 2008, AIG could not pay, and the government put in more than $180 billion so that it could. Synthetic collateralized debt obligations, which are bets on bundles of mortgages made by people who own none of them, had no limit, and the law that had preempted the gambling statutes was the reason they were legal.

Dodd-Frank in 2010 required most standard swaps to be cleared and reported. When regulators tried to apply the tougher rules to any bank trading more than $100 million a year in swaps, the industry got the threshold raised to $8 billion, which left about 85 percent of derivatives players outside the rules.

← 1975 to 2000

Primary Sources (2)

Documents, court filings, official reports, and broadcasts cited in this report.

2000
Congress.gov. Kept over-the-counter derivatives outside regulation.
2012
FRONTLINE (PBS). The origin of the credit default swap and the decision not to regulate derivatives.

Documented Records (9)

Chronological entries extracted from the primary sources above.

1994
June 1994
JP Morgan's derivatives group, most of them in their twenties, met at a resort in Boca Raton and worked out how to separate the risk of a loan from the loan itself. This became the credit default swap.
“This idea was essentially created under the banner of making the financial system safer.”
JP Morgan. Violates: None at the time. This is where the market started.. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
1997
1990s
The first large credit default swap moved JP Morgan's exposure to Exxon to a bank in London, which allowed JP Morgan to hold less capital against the loan and lend more. Other banks learned they could use the same method to reduce their capital requirements.
“Credit derivatives made it possible for a bank to skirt capital requirements.”
JP Morgan, Blythe Masters. Violates: Capital requirements meant to keep banks solvent. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
1998
1998
JP Morgan wrote a single swap covering 306 companies, divided it into tranches with different levels of risk, and then began selling contracts based on portfolios it did not own. These became known as synthetic CDOs.
“It's just a pure bet by somebody who has no economic interest in what they're betting on.”
JP Morgan, Terri Duhon. Violates: None at the time. These contracts were unregulated.. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
1998
Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, warned that unregulated derivatives would build up risk until they caused a crisis and a taxpayer bailout. The banks lobbied against regulation, and Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan supported the banks.
“Regulation of derivatives transactions that are privately negotiated by professionals is unnecessary.”
Alan Greenspan, the banking lobby. Violates: The government's responsibility to protect the public's money. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
2000
December 2000
Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which kept over-the-counter derivatives outside the authority of regulators. The market had no public reporting and no oversight, and it grew rapidly.
“The derivatives market went into darkness, almost no transparency and no regulation.”
Congress. Violates: Equal application of the law to the financial industry. Source: Commodity Futures Modernization Act, H.R.5660, 106th Congress (2000), Congress.gov
2003
2003
Georgia passed the strictest predatory lending law in the country. The mortgage lobby worked to defeat Governor Roy Barnes at the next election, and the new legislature removed most of the law about two weeks into its session.
“You would have thought I had recommended that we repeal the plan of Salvation. Why were they so opposed to it? Money.”
The mortgage lobby, the Georgia legislature. Violates: Consent of the governed. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
2005
2003 to 2006
The chief executive of Wells Fargo told meetings of bankers and regulators, including Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, that subprime mortgage securities were toxic and that a bubble was forming. The bankers involved in the market said there was no problem.
“This is toxic waste. We're building a bubble. We're not going to like the outcome.”
Federal Reserve, Wall Street banks. Violates: Regulators' duty to act on warnings. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
2007
2007
Goldman Sachs assembled CDOs containing subprime mortgages, sold them to customers, and used credit default swaps to bet that they would fail. It later settled with the SEC over marketing materials that left out important information.
“They bet against their own clients, so when the clients lost money, Goldman was making money.”
Goldman Sachs. Violates: The duty not to deceive customers. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
2011
2011
No bank chief executive was removed by the government or prosecuted for the crisis. An economist interviewed in the film said there was clear evidence of illegality and that prosecutions would have succeeded.
“It is pretty clear, actually, that there was massive illegality going on.”
Department of Justice. Violates: Equal justice under law. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)

Timeline Events (1)

Dated events from this investigation in the site timeline.

December 21, 2000
Commodity Futures Modernization Act signed, exempting swaps from regulation
Its 262 pages were attached to the year end spending bill and passed both houses in a day without debate on the derivatives provisions.
The 2000 Commodity Futures Modernization Act That Deregulated Credit Default Swaps | Spirit of '76