2001 to 2012: After September 11 · Wall Street & Banking
How Credit Default Swaps and Deregulation Caused the 2008 Financial Crisis
Period covered: 1994 to 2011 · 3 sources
Summary
In June 1994 a group of young JP Morgan bankers at a resort in Boca Raton worked out how to sell the risk of a loan separately from the loan. The idea was meant to make banking safer. It let banks hold less capital, it was kept out of regulation by Congress and the Federal Reserve, and applied to mortgages it produced the machine that failed in 2008 and cost Americans $11 trillion.
FRONTLINE's four part series Money, Power and Wall Street begins in the fall of 2011, when bankers arriving in Lower Manhattan found Occupy Wall Street on the sidewalk. The recession had destroyed $11 trillion of Americans' net worth and 8.5 million jobs. Houses were worth less than people paid for them. The banks had been bailed out and had recovered, and the rest of the country had not. Bankers at the hearings that followed said finance had become too complicated for anyone to understand.
Boca Raton, June 1994
The Global Derivatives Group at JP Morgan, most of them in their twenties, met at a resort in Boca Raton, Florida. They were working on an old problem in banking, how to reduce risk. Derivatives had existed for hundreds of years as a way for farmers to protect themselves against changing crop prices. The JP Morgan team took that idea and applied it to loans for the first time: separate the risk of a loan going bad from the loan itself, and sell the risk. That is a credit default swap.
The first big one was built by Blythe Masters around Exxon. After the Exxon Valdez spill, Exxon took a multi-billion dollar letter of credit from JP Morgan, which meant that if Exxon failed to pay, the bank had to. Banking regulations required JP Morgan to set aside capital against that exposure. Masters found a buyer for the risk, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in London, which was paid to take it on. The bank's capital was freed to do more business. The film's summary is that credit derivatives made it possible for a bank to get around capital requirements, and as the amount of capital banks had to hold went down, the amount of credit they could create went up.
In 1998 the bank scaled it up. Terri Duhon was brought in to build a trading book. Her first trade was a credit default swap on 306 corporate names on JP Morgan's books, sliced into layers so that investors could pick how much risk they wanted. From there the bank began selling derivatives that were simply bets on any portfolio, whether the bank owned it or not. These were synthetic collateralized debt obligations. Duhon said that once the seed was planted there was no stopping it. Other banks followed. A derivatives salesman at Morgan Stanley remembered the pressure at every meeting to get customers involved.
A private market
The market was private, unregulated, and out of view. There was no exchange, no published price, and no way for anyone outside a trade to know what positions existed. Because of that, the spreads were several times larger than on ordinary securities. One banker in the documentary put it at ten times the fee of a large stock offering for the same size deal.
In Washington, Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, warned that without transparency and regulation the risk would build until it caused a crisis and a taxpayer bailout. A senator warned on the Senate floor about $33 trillion in derivatives, much of it held by the 25 largest banks, and said that one day the risk would wake everyone up with a thud. The banks lobbied against any regulation, because, as one interviewee said, they did not want to have to put the risk on their balance sheets. Others wanted swaps regulated as insurance, since that is what they are, and insurers have to hold enough money to pay claims. A credit default swap requires no reserves and no disclosure. Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan told Congress that regulation of privately negotiated derivatives was unnecessary. Congress then passed the law that repealed Glass-Steagall and let banks grow, and the law that kept credit derivatives out of oversight. The film's words are that the derivatives market went into darkness.
Mortgages
The next application was consumer debt, and mortgages in particular. The goal was a security with a top rating and a high yield, and the way to get there was to bundle risky loans, insure a slice of the bundle with credit default swaps, and take the package to Moody's. In the 1980s no bank wanted subprime mortgages. Securitization changed that. Roy Barnes, the former governor of Georgia, described the result in Atlanta as a feeding frenzy: loans thrown at people, second mortgages at 27.5 percent, rates as high as 42 percent, loans larger than the value of the house, loans with no income. In 2002 Georgia passed the toughest predatory lending law in the country. The mortgage lobby threatened that no investor would buy a Georgia mortgage, helped unseat Barnes that November, and the law was gutted about two weeks into the next legislative session.
JP Morgan traded mortgage risk but could not get comfortable with it, because it had decades of data on how companies behaved through business cycles and almost none on home loans. Its bankers saw UBS and Merrill Lynch reporting faster growth in securitized products and assumed those banks had found a way to lay off the risk. They had not. They were holding it. Some of the original JP Morgan team began to get worried. One remembered a call to approve a deal where someone finally said, "I'm nervous," and the group realized that every small change along the way had been approved until the product was nothing like what they started with.
Other banks kept going. London became a second base, where deals could be done outside SEC registration. German state banks, the Landesbanks and IKB, bought whatever was offered. A former JP Morgan salesperson said everyone at the bank envied whoever covered those accounts. By the end of 2005 the outstanding value of credit default swaps was in the trillions and doubling every year. Asked whether regulators understood the instruments, a banker in the documentary said no, and that neither did the rating agencies or many of the banks.
The end
Synthetic CDOs had no limit, because a bet on a pool of mortgages could be made again and again by people who owned none of them. The film compares it to betting on a horse race. Dick Kovacevich, the chief executive of Wells Fargo, said that in meetings with Chairman Bernanke and thirty or forty bankers between 2003 and 2006 he called the product toxic waste and said the industry was building a bubble. The bankers who were in it told him he was wrong. Nobody was modeling a 25 percent fall in house prices, and as long as prices never fell the risk never came home.
Prices began falling in late 2006. By 2007 and 2008 the banks were trying to get the paper off their books, and some were profiting from the collapse. According to a congressional investigation, Goldman Sachs built CDOs of subprime debt, sold them to clients, and bet against them with credit default swaps. It settled with the SEC, admitting its marketing materials left out important information, while maintaining that its clients were sophisticated institutions. IKB, one of those clients, was the first bank to fail, in July 2007. Citigroup discovered it had moved risk off its books through one business and taken it back through another. AIG had written $440 billion of credit default swaps with nowhere near the capital to pay them, and nobody knew, because there was no disclosure. On September 18, 2008, a bank executive at a conference watched his fellow chief executives reading their phones and asked one of them what was wrong. The answer was that the world had ended. AIG got an $85 billion bailout.
The film ends where the loans were made. In Atlanta neighborhoods the houses sit vacant, vandalized, and sometimes burned, and nobody can say who owns them because the mortgages were sliced into pools held by investors around the world. Kovacevich's judgment was that most past crises came from an oil shock or a war, and this one came from about twenty institutions that lost control of their risk, and that it should never have happened.
Primary Sources (3)
Documents, court filings, official reports, and broadcasts cited in this report.
Documented Records (10)
Chronological entries extracted from the primary sources above.
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