2001 to 2012: After September 11 · Wall Street & Banking

How Credit Default Swaps and Deregulation Caused the 2008 Financial Crisis

Period covered: 1994 to 2011 · 3 sources

Summary

In June 1994 a group of young JP Morgan bankers at a resort in Boca Raton worked out how to sell the risk of a loan separately from the loan. The idea was meant to make banking safer. It let banks hold less capital, it was kept out of regulation by Congress and the Federal Reserve, and applied to mortgages it produced the machine that failed in 2008 and cost Americans $11 trillion.

FRONTLINE's four part series Money, Power and Wall Street begins in the fall of 2011, when bankers arriving in Lower Manhattan found Occupy Wall Street on the sidewalk. The recession had destroyed $11 trillion of Americans' net worth and 8.5 million jobs. Houses were worth less than people paid for them. The banks had been bailed out and had recovered, and the rest of the country had not. Bankers at the hearings that followed said finance had become too complicated for anyone to understand.

Boca Raton, June 1994

The Global Derivatives Group at JP Morgan, most of them in their twenties, met at a resort in Boca Raton, Florida. They were working on an old problem in banking, how to reduce risk. Derivatives had existed for hundreds of years as a way for farmers to protect themselves against changing crop prices. The JP Morgan team took that idea and applied it to loans for the first time: separate the risk of a loan going bad from the loan itself, and sell the risk. That is a credit default swap.

The first big one was built by Blythe Masters around Exxon. After the Exxon Valdez spill, Exxon took a multi-billion dollar letter of credit from JP Morgan, which meant that if Exxon failed to pay, the bank had to. Banking regulations required JP Morgan to set aside capital against that exposure. Masters found a buyer for the risk, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in London, which was paid to take it on. The bank's capital was freed to do more business. The film's summary is that credit derivatives made it possible for a bank to get around capital requirements, and as the amount of capital banks had to hold went down, the amount of credit they could create went up.

In 1998 the bank scaled it up. Terri Duhon was brought in to build a trading book. Her first trade was a credit default swap on 306 corporate names on JP Morgan's books, sliced into layers so that investors could pick how much risk they wanted. From there the bank began selling derivatives that were simply bets on any portfolio, whether the bank owned it or not. These were synthetic collateralized debt obligations. Duhon said that once the seed was planted there was no stopping it. Other banks followed. A derivatives salesman at Morgan Stanley remembered the pressure at every meeting to get customers involved.

A private market

The market was private, unregulated, and out of view. There was no exchange, no published price, and no way for anyone outside a trade to know what positions existed. Because of that, the spreads were several times larger than on ordinary securities. One banker in the documentary put it at ten times the fee of a large stock offering for the same size deal.

In Washington, Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, warned that without transparency and regulation the risk would build until it caused a crisis and a taxpayer bailout. A senator warned on the Senate floor about $33 trillion in derivatives, much of it held by the 25 largest banks, and said that one day the risk would wake everyone up with a thud. The banks lobbied against any regulation, because, as one interviewee said, they did not want to have to put the risk on their balance sheets. Others wanted swaps regulated as insurance, since that is what they are, and insurers have to hold enough money to pay claims. A credit default swap requires no reserves and no disclosure. Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan told Congress that regulation of privately negotiated derivatives was unnecessary. Congress then passed the law that repealed Glass-Steagall and let banks grow, and the law that kept credit derivatives out of oversight. The film's words are that the derivatives market went into darkness.

Mortgages

The next application was consumer debt, and mortgages in particular. The goal was a security with a top rating and a high yield, and the way to get there was to bundle risky loans, insure a slice of the bundle with credit default swaps, and take the package to Moody's. In the 1980s no bank wanted subprime mortgages. Securitization changed that. Roy Barnes, the former governor of Georgia, described the result in Atlanta as a feeding frenzy: loans thrown at people, second mortgages at 27.5 percent, rates as high as 42 percent, loans larger than the value of the house, loans with no income. In 2002 Georgia passed the toughest predatory lending law in the country. The mortgage lobby threatened that no investor would buy a Georgia mortgage, helped unseat Barnes that November, and the law was gutted about two weeks into the next legislative session.

JP Morgan traded mortgage risk but could not get comfortable with it, because it had decades of data on how companies behaved through business cycles and almost none on home loans. Its bankers saw UBS and Merrill Lynch reporting faster growth in securitized products and assumed those banks had found a way to lay off the risk. They had not. They were holding it. Some of the original JP Morgan team began to get worried. One remembered a call to approve a deal where someone finally said, "I'm nervous," and the group realized that every small change along the way had been approved until the product was nothing like what they started with.

Other banks kept going. London became a second base, where deals could be done outside SEC registration. German state banks, the Landesbanks and IKB, bought whatever was offered. A former JP Morgan salesperson said everyone at the bank envied whoever covered those accounts. By the end of 2005 the outstanding value of credit default swaps was in the trillions and doubling every year. Asked whether regulators understood the instruments, a banker in the documentary said no, and that neither did the rating agencies or many of the banks.

The end

Synthetic CDOs had no limit, because a bet on a pool of mortgages could be made again and again by people who owned none of them. The film compares it to betting on a horse race. Dick Kovacevich, the chief executive of Wells Fargo, said that in meetings with Chairman Bernanke and thirty or forty bankers between 2003 and 2006 he called the product toxic waste and said the industry was building a bubble. The bankers who were in it told him he was wrong. Nobody was modeling a 25 percent fall in house prices, and as long as prices never fell the risk never came home.

Prices began falling in late 2006. By 2007 and 2008 the banks were trying to get the paper off their books, and some were profiting from the collapse. According to a congressional investigation, Goldman Sachs built CDOs of subprime debt, sold them to clients, and bet against them with credit default swaps. It settled with the SEC, admitting its marketing materials left out important information, while maintaining that its clients were sophisticated institutions. IKB, one of those clients, was the first bank to fail, in July 2007. Citigroup discovered it had moved risk off its books through one business and taken it back through another. AIG had written $440 billion of credit default swaps with nowhere near the capital to pay them, and nobody knew, because there was no disclosure. On September 18, 2008, a bank executive at a conference watched his fellow chief executives reading their phones and asked one of them what was wrong. The answer was that the world had ended. AIG got an $85 billion bailout.

The film ends where the loans were made. In Atlanta neighborhoods the houses sit vacant, vandalized, and sometimes burned, and nobody can say who owns them because the mortgages were sliced into pools held by investors around the world. Kovacevich's judgment was that most past crises came from an oil shock or a war, and this one came from about twenty institutions that lost control of their risk, and that it should never have happened.

← 2001 to 2012

Primary Sources (3)

Documents, court filings, official reports, and broadcasts cited in this report.

1999
Congress.gov. Repealed the Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking.
2000
Congress.gov. Kept over-the-counter derivatives outside regulation.
2012
FRONTLINE (PBS). The origin of the credit default swap and the decision not to regulate derivatives.

Documented Records (10)

Chronological entries extracted from the primary sources above.

1994
June 1994
JP Morgan's derivatives group, most of them in their twenties, met at a resort in Boca Raton and worked out how to separate the risk of a loan from the loan itself. This became the credit default swap.
“This idea was essentially created under the banner of making the financial system safer.”
JP Morgan. Violates: None at the time. This is where the market started.. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
1997
1990s
The first large credit default swap moved JP Morgan's exposure to Exxon to a bank in London, which allowed JP Morgan to hold less capital against the loan and lend more. Other banks learned they could use the same method to reduce their capital requirements.
“Credit derivatives made it possible for a bank to skirt capital requirements.”
JP Morgan, Blythe Masters. Violates: Capital requirements meant to keep banks solvent. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
1998
1998
JP Morgan wrote a single swap covering 306 companies, divided it into tranches with different levels of risk, and then began selling contracts based on portfolios it did not own. These became known as synthetic CDOs.
“It's just a pure bet by somebody who has no economic interest in what they're betting on.”
JP Morgan, Terri Duhon. Violates: None at the time. These contracts were unregulated.. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
1998
Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, warned that unregulated derivatives would build up risk until they caused a crisis and a taxpayer bailout. The banks lobbied against regulation, and Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan supported the banks.
“Regulation of derivatives transactions that are privately negotiated by professionals is unnecessary.”
Alan Greenspan, the banking lobby. Violates: The government's responsibility to protect the public's money. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
1999
November 1999
Congress repealed the Glass-Steagall Act. Commercial banks that hold deposits could now merge with investment banks. At the merged companies the trading side grew to several times the size of the banking side.
“The Glass-Steagall law is no longer appropriate.”
Congress, President Clinton. Violates: The separation of deposit banking from trading, in place since 1933. Source: Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, S.900, 106th Congress (1999), Congress.gov
2000
December 2000
Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which kept over-the-counter derivatives outside the authority of regulators. The market had no public reporting and no oversight, and it grew rapidly.
“The derivatives market went into darkness, almost no transparency and no regulation.”
Congress. Violates: Equal application of the law to the financial industry. Source: Commodity Futures Modernization Act, H.R.5660, 106th Congress (2000), Congress.gov
2003
2003
Georgia passed the strictest predatory lending law in the country. The mortgage lobby worked to defeat Governor Roy Barnes at the next election, and the new legislature removed most of the law about two weeks into its session.
“You would have thought I had recommended that we repeal the plan of Salvation. Why were they so opposed to it? Money.”
The mortgage lobby, the Georgia legislature. Violates: Consent of the governed. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
2005
2003 to 2006
The chief executive of Wells Fargo told meetings of bankers and regulators, including Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, that subprime mortgage securities were toxic and that a bubble was forming. The bankers involved in the market said there was no problem.
“This is toxic waste. We're building a bubble. We're not going to like the outcome.”
Federal Reserve, Wall Street banks. Violates: Regulators' duty to act on warnings. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
2007
2007
Goldman Sachs assembled CDOs containing subprime mortgages, sold them to customers, and used credit default swaps to bet that they would fail. It later settled with the SEC over marketing materials that left out important information.
“They bet against their own clients, so when the clients lost money, Goldman was making money.”
Goldman Sachs. Violates: The duty not to deceive customers. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
2011
2011
No bank chief executive was removed by the government or prosecuted for the crisis. An economist interviewed in the film said there was clear evidence of illegality and that prosecutions would have succeeded.
“It is pretty clear, actually, that there was massive illegality going on.”
Department of Justice. Violates: Equal justice under law. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One, FRONTLINE (PBS)
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