2001 to 2012: After September 11 · Wall Street & Banking

The October 2008 Bank Bailout: $125 Billion Handed to Nine Wall Street Banks with No Strings Attached

Period covered: March to October 2008 · 2 sources

Summary

In 2008 the government rescued Bear Stearns, let Lehman Brothers fail, then rescued AIG and paid the banks' claims against it in full. On October 13 the heads of the nine largest banks were called to the Treasury, handed $125 billion, and told they could not leave until they signed. The terms required nothing of them.

Across seven months of 2008—from the morning Bear Stearns began to fail in March to the afternoon of October 13 when the Treasury handed the nine largest banks $125 billion—federal officials improvised a rescue of Wall Street with no public accountability.

Bear Stearns, March

On a normal morning in March 2008 the stock of Bear Stearns began to fall on a rumor that the bank was running out of cash. Bear had built its business on buying hundreds of thousands of subprime mortgages, packaging them, and selling them. Customers pulled their money and other banks stopped trading with it. By the early hours of the next morning teams from the Federal Reserve, the SEC, and JP Morgan were inside the building, and what they found was a bank full of toxic assets and credit default swap deals worth trillions of dollars with counterparties all over the world. Timothy Geithner, the president of the New York Fed, concluded that a Bear bankruptcy would set off a chain of failures and that the bank was too big to fail.

The collapse took federal regulators almost entirely by surprise. Phil Angelides, who later chaired the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, said the record shows the people charged with overseeing the system did not know the risks embedded in it and had deliberately turned a blind eye. For three decades Washington had moved toward a hands off attitude, and the products at the center of the crisis had been built inside markets with no regulation and no transparency, because, as one witness said, transparency drives profits down.

Geithner called Fed chairman Ben Bernanke at 4 a.m. Bernanke, a scholar of the Great Depression, feared a loss of confidence in the banks above anything else. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, who had run Goldman Sachs two years earlier and believed the market rewards and punishes without help, agreed to a rescue. The Fed used powers unused since the Depression, took $30 billion of Bear's worst assets, and let JP Morgan buy the rest. One witness described it as the government taking the vinegar and letting JP Morgan have the wine.

The summer of assurances

The rescue followed a playbook Geithner had learned in the Clinton Treasury under Robert Rubin and Larry Summers, when American banks exposed to crises in Mexico, Thailand, and South Korea were protected by loans of hundreds of billions through the International Monetary Fund. The first rule was to flood the banks with money so they would keep lending. Paulson worried about the message. He said publicly that Bear was a one time event and that the rest of Wall Street was on its own. This is the idea of moral hazard: if you bail people out of a problem they caused, they have no reason not to cause it again.

Through the summer, President Bush left the crisis to Paulson. Bush's speechwriter Matt Latimer said the White House list of good economic news kept getting shorter as items stopped being true. Paulson and Bernanke said the economy would work its way through. Asked later why the government did nothing in those months, Assistant Treasury Secretary Michele Davis said the government lacked the authority to prevent a disaster it could see coming, that it was the summer of an election year, and that there was no realistic chance of getting new authority from Congress. Angelides' question was why nobody stood up and said this was bigger than Bear Stearns.

Lehman, September

By September Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank, was borrowing a quarter of a trillion dollars a day to survive. Its chief executive, Dick Fuld, believed the government would never let it fail. On Friday, September 12, the heads of the largest banks were called to the New York Fed for 6 p.m. Paulson told them Lehman was dying and that there would be no government money. The other banks would not rescue it. Robert Wolf, the chairman of UBS Americas, was stepping out of the meetings to brief Barack Obama by phone: Lehman could go, and AIG and Merrill Lynch were right behind it.

One witness in the documentary called the weekend a historic failure, saying Geithner should have spent the summer planning for a Lehman failure instead of managing it from a BlackBerry. Lehman filed for bankruptcy Monday morning. Paulson went to the White House podium and said the American people could remain confident in the soundness of the financial system. The Fed and the Treasury had believed Lehman could fail without a cataclysm. Everything froze. No bank would lend to another. A money market fund broke the buck. The commercial paper market failed. Manufacturers began calling Paulson because they could not borrow. Geithner's phone logs show 55 calls that day. The policymakers had saved Bear and let Lehman go, and the market no longer knew what to expect.

AIG

The next crisis arrived within a day. AIG, the largest insurance company in the world, had promised to pay out on credit default swaps if Lehman failed, on the assumption that it never would, and did not have the money. Geithner and Paulson were learning the details of AIG's business in real time, without time even to identify the counterparties. Geithner argued that an AIG failure would be worse than Lehman, and Paulson reversed himself. AIG would be rescued.

Geithner then decided the question that determined where the money went. The banks holding AIG's swaps, Goldman Sachs among them, could have been required to take a discount on their claims, what Wall Street calls a haircut, since without the government they would have collected nothing. Geithner decided they would be paid in full, because his plan rested on confidence. The rescue put the government on the hook for more than $180 billion, and billions of it flowed straight through AIG to the banks. One interviewee said that even a 10 percent haircut would have helped and that the government threw more money at the problem than it needed to.

Congress

By Wednesday the world's capital markets had shut down. Bernanke told Paulson the case by case approach was over and that he had to go to Congress. On Thursday afternoon the two men met the congressional leadership in Speaker Pelosi's office and asked for $700 billion. Bernanke told them that without action there would not be an economy by Monday. One member described a pause in which the oxygen left the room. The leaders said the Senate could not move that fast. Conservative Republicans in the House revolted, calling it Paulson's bill to help his friends. Senator McCain suspended his campaign and asked for a White House meeting; at that meeting, on September 25, Obama was prepared, McCain fumbled with a card of notes, the room dissolved into shouting, and President Bush left saying he had lost control of the meeting. The House passed the bill a week later, 263 to 171. Paulson had $700 billion, the Troubled Asset Relief Program.

October 13

On Sunday, October 12, Paulson called the heads of the nine largest banks and told each of them to be at the Treasury at 3 p.m. Monday without saying why. In the conference room across from his office he told them the government would inject capital into each of their companies, and Geithner went around the table with the amounts. Richard Kovacevich of Wells Fargo was told $25 billion and said he almost fell out of his chair. He told Paulson he did not want the money and did not need it. Paulson told him his regulator was sitting at the table and that if he refused he would be declared capital deficient Monday morning. Each man was given a single sheet of terms and told he could not leave until he had signed. All nine signed.

The terms asked nothing of them. No mortgages had to be modified. No limits were placed on pay or bonuses. No regulatory changes were required. The Treasury had given $125 billion to the richest banks in the country, and it was the beginning.

The film ends with the question its interviewees kept returning to: not whether the bailout was right or wrong, but how the government and the financial industry maneuvered the country into a choice between committing trillions of dollars to save the banks, while still losing millions of jobs and homes, and total collapse.

← 2001 to 2012

Primary Sources (2)

Documents, court filings, official reports, and broadcasts cited in this report.

2011
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, GovInfo. The official report on the causes of the crisis.
2012
FRONTLINE (PBS). Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and TARP.

Documented Records (7)

Chronological entries extracted from the primary sources above.

2008
March 2008
Bear Stearns ran out of cash. The Federal Reserve used emergency powers that had not been used since the Depression and about $30 billion in public funds to arrange its sale to JP Morgan. The troubled assets went to the government and the rest went to the bank.
“It's kind of like if Uncle Sam had come in and taken all the vinegar and allowed JP Morgan to have the wine.”
Federal Reserve, Tim Geithner, JP Morgan. Violates: Use of public money to cover private losses. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part Two, FRONTLINE (PBS)
Summer 2008
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve told the public the economy was sound while the list of good economic news shrank. A Treasury official later said the department knew it had no authority to prevent what was coming and did not ask Congress for any because it was an election year.
“The American people expect the Federal government to have the authority to prevent a disaster when they can see it coming. And we don't have that authority.”
Treasury Secretary Paulson, Chairman Bernanke, President Bush. Violates: The government's duty to tell the public the truth. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part Two, FRONTLINE (PBS)
September 15, 2008
Lehman Brothers was allowed to go bankrupt on the grounds of moral hazard. Payments between banks stopped. Two days later the same officials rescued AIG with more than $180 billion.
“They saved Bear. They didn't save Lehman. So the marketplace doesn't know what to expect.”
Treasury Secretary Paulson. Violates: Consistent application of the rules. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part Two, FRONTLINE (PBS)
September 2008
Geithner decided that the banks holding AIG's contracts would be paid in full rather than taking a reduction. Goldman Sachs and other banks received billions of dollars in public money through AIG.
“I think we threw more money at the problem than we needed to. Absolutely.”
Tim Geithner, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Violates: Use of public money to cover private losses. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part Two, FRONTLINE (PBS)
September 2008
Paulson and Bernanke told congressional leaders that without $700 billion by the following Monday the financial system would collapse. Members of the House said they were being asked to choose between a bailout and a depression with a few days to decide.
“If we do not act now, we will not have an economy by Monday.”
Treasury, Federal Reserve, Congress. Violates: Consent of the governed. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part Two, FRONTLINE (PBS)
October 13, 2008
Nine bank chief executives were called to the Treasury and told they could not leave until they accepted $125 billion in public capital. No mortgage modifications, pay limits, bonus limits, or regulatory changes were required. When the chairman of Wells Fargo objected, he was told his bank would be declared capital-deficient the next business day.
“Basically, they are sitting fat and pretty and happy.”
Treasury Secretary Paulson. Violates: Public money given without conditions. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part Two, FRONTLINE (PBS)
2011
2011
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that regulators at the Federal Reserve, the SEC, and other agencies had ignored evidence of the risks building in the financial system.
“They had deliberately turned a blind eye to those problems.”
Federal Reserve, SEC. Violates: Regulators' duty to act on warnings. Source: The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, GovInfo

Timeline Events (2)

Dated events from this investigation in the site timeline.

October 13, 2008
Nine bank chief executives given $125 billion in public capital at a single meeting
No mortgage modifications, pay limits, bonus limits, or regulatory changes were required. The chairman of Wells Fargo said he did not want the money and was told his bank would be declared capital-deficient if he refused.
September 15, 2008
Lehman Brothers allowed to fail
Payments between banks stopped. Two days later the same officials rescued AIG with more than $180 billion and paid its counterparties in full.
The October 2008 Bank Bailout: $125 Billion Handed to Nine Wall Street Banks with No Strings Attached | Spirit of '76