2001 to 2012: After September 11 · Wall Street & Banking

Obama, Timothy Geithner, and the 2009 Decision Not to Break Up the Big Banks

Period covered: November 2008 to July 2010 · 2 sources

Summary

In 2009 President Obama had to choose between breaking up the banks that caused the crisis and nursing them back to health. He chose Timothy Geithner's plan. On March 27 he told thirteen bank chief executives he was all that stood between them and the pitchforks, then offered to help. Records later pried loose by Bloomberg showed the banks had borrowed $1.2 trillion from the Federal Reserve in a single day.

When the Obama administration took office in January 2009, the financial system was still in free fall. The country had lost 650,000 jobs in the three months before the inauguration. The stock market was down more than 6,000 points. Citigroup was failing during the transition and the outgoing Treasury put another $20 billion into it. One interviewee described the period as one in which nobody was in charge.

Who would run it

Obama had campaigned with a group of reform minded economists around him: Robert Reich, Joseph Stiglitz, and Paul Volcker, the former Fed chairman who wanted the banks regulated and was feared on Wall Street. The film frames the choice in front of the new president as one between reforming Wall Street and rebuilding it. For treasury secretary Obama chose Timothy Geithner, the president of the New York Fed, who had led the Bush administration's response, engineered the Bear Stearns rescue, gone along with letting Lehman fail, and pushed the AIG bailout. One interviewee said Geithner was a protege of Robert Rubin and therefore of and from Wall Street, and would see the economy the way Wall Street sees it. For chief economic adviser Obama chose Larry Summers, Clinton's last treasury secretary, who had since made millions at a hedge fund. Obama was told the choice would look like bringing in the same plumbers who caused the leak. His team's answer was that there was no time for anyone who did not already know the job.

The stress tests

Geithner arrived at a Treasury whose website listed position after position as vacant. On February 9, 2009, the president announced that his secretary would present the plan the next day. The speech was rewritten overnight after Summers said the draft sounded amateurish. Geithner, who had never given a national press conference or appeared on television, read it from two teleprompters, and the Dow fell nearly 400 points while he spoke. The plan was a stress test: the government would examine the books of the largest banks, publish what it found, and put capital into the ones that needed it. The bet was that if the markets could be convinced the hole was smaller than feared, confidence would return on its own. Within three weeks Washington was asking whether Geithner would be the first to go. In the Oval Office he defended the plan without flinching, and the president kept him.

The argument inside the White House

In Congress, the heads of the banks were lined up at a hearing and, in one witness's words, given a public whipping. Ken Lewis of Bank of America, whose bank had taken more than $45 billion, said he went in knowing that was the point. At the White House, David Axelrod, Robert Gibbs, and Summers wanted a scalp, and the talk turned to firing Lewis. A member of Congress asked why the British government could take over the Royal Bank of Scotland and fire its chief executive, and the American government could fire the head of a car company, but not the head of a bank. Geithner argued against it. He called it Old Testament justice and said it would frighten off the private investors the banks needed. His rule, borrowed from medicine, was first do no harm.

Summers wanted more. He believed the losses ran to trillions, that the system was broken, and that the government should take over and restructure at least one of the too big to fail banks, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, or Bank of America, to show Wall Street that gambling with the country's fortune and losing has consequences. Christina Romer agreed with him. Geithner said taking over a bank was like pushing a boulder down a hill without knowing whether you could stop it. On March 15, 2009 the president put the two of them through a six hour argument. Critics inside and outside the administration said the stress tests were a confidence game and that a stress test can be cooked to produce the result you want. Summers called the plan watchful waiting. Geithner said it was real action and made the case point by point. The president kept his own counsel.

March 27

Two weeks later thirteen bankers were called to the White House. They had been told the president would vent the public's anger. They feared a ban on too big to fail, limits on pay, and a requirement to refinance the mortgages of homeowners who owed more than their houses were worth. One witness said they had not been that nervous since nursery school.

The president spoke first and told them that his administration was the only thing between them and the pitchforks. Then, according to the account in the documentary, he pulled back as fast as he could. He told them that what they had was a public relations disaster turning into a political disaster, and that he was there to help. He asked for no commitments. Lewis took it as a turning point, a signal that the banks were the way out of the mess and the past could be put aside. The bankers went out to the cameras and said they were all in it together. One interviewee called it an opportunity lost: a room full of frightened chief executives, a president in a position to make demands, and no demands made. Another asked how the government could bail out the banks with no strings attached when everyone on Main Street who managed to get a loan got it with strings.

What was not known

The bankers in that room had already received more than $180 billion from the federal government with almost no conditions. What nobody outside knew was that they had also been borrowing from the Federal Reserve on a scale that came out only after Bloomberg News fought for the records all the way to the Supreme Court. On the peak day, December 5, 2008, the banks had $1.2 trillion in Fed loans outstanding. Morgan Stanley alone had $107 billion out on a single day, Citigroup more than $99 billion, Bank of America $91 billion. In all, the Fed made available more than $7.7 trillion in loans, commitments, and guarantees to financial institutions around the world, including foreign banks.

In May 2009 the stress tests found all 19 of the largest banks fundamentally healthy. Geithner took the results to the president. The banks reported large profits that spring. One of the president's economic advisers said later that the plan was effective, that the financial sector was highly profitable again, and that the problem was that it was about the only sector that was.

Reform

By August 2009 the Tea Party was holding rallies in all fifty states, angry above all about the bailouts, and much of the anger was aimed at the president. Rahm Emanuel, the chief of staff, told the president the moment for Old Testament justice had come. On the first anniversary of Lehman's failure Obama went to Federal Hall, steps from the stock exchange, to call for reform. Jamie Dimon, Lloyd Blankfein, and the other heads of the large banks did not attend. None of them had been fired or prosecuted.

The White House then spent its energy on health care, and reform of the banks was left to Congress in 2010, by which time the banks had recovered and could afford to fight. Interviewees in the documentary describe armies of lobbyists, the best money could hire, paid with money the government had put into the banks, working to weaken the bill loophole by loophole. The proposals to break up the too big to fail banks were kept out. On July 21, 2010 the president signed Dodd-Frank and said there would be no more tax funded bailouts, period. A member of his own administration said the bill left so much undecided that the important decisions were still being made out of public view, where the lobbyists could reach them, and worried that the lessons of the crash had not been learned.

The film ends with three judgments. Too big to fail has been institutionalized, and the next crisis could be larger. The three things that had to be fixed, too big to fail, risky investments, and derivatives, were not fixed. And the crisis never ended. People think of a run up to September 2008, a bailout, and an end. The clouds are still over the global economy and they are still full of risk.

← 2001 to 2012

Primary Sources (2)

Documents, court filings, official reports, and broadcasts cited in this report.

2012
FRONTLINE (PBS). The 2009 transition, the stress tests, and Dodd-Frank.

Documented Records (6)

Chronological entries extracted from the primary sources above.

2008
December 5, 2008
On this day the banks had $1.2 trillion in Federal Reserve loans outstanding, including $107 billion at Morgan Stanley, $99 billion at Citigroup, and $91 billion at Bank of America. In total the Fed made $7.7 trillion available. None of this was public until Bloomberg won a lawsuit at the Supreme Court.
“The biggest banks in the United States borrowed a heck of a lot more money than anybody had imagined.”
Federal Reserve. Violates: The public's right to know how public money is used. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part Three, FRONTLINE (PBS)
2009
March 2009
The president met with thirteen bank chief executives, told them his administration was standing between them and public anger, and asked for no commitments. No conditions were set and no executives were removed.
“He had a room full of very frightened CEOs. He was in a position then to make demands, and he didn't.”
President Obama. Violates: Accountability for the people responsible. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part Three, FRONTLINE (PBS)
May 7, 2009
The Treasury's stress tests found the 19 largest banks to be fundamentally sound. Critics inside and outside the administration said the tests were designed to produce that result.
“It's not that hard to cook a stress test and make it look like you're in much better shape than you are.”
Treasury Secretary Geithner. Violates: The government's duty to tell the public the truth. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part Three, FRONTLINE (PBS)
September 2009
One year after the Lehman bankruptcy the president gave a speech on Wall Street calling for reform. The heads of the major banks, including Jamie Dimon and Lloyd Blankfein, did not attend.
“They don't even show up to the speech. They just had better things to do that day.”
Wall Street chief executives. Violates: Accountability for the people responsible. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part Three, FRONTLINE (PBS)
2010
July 21, 2010
The Dodd-Frank Act was signed with a promise that there would be no more taxpayer bailouts. Proposals to break up the largest banks had been removed from the bill by lobbyists. The industry then spent more than $320 million lobbying on the rules, and the Volcker Rule grew from 10 pages to nearly 300, most of them exemptions.
“The banks have thrown every weapon they have on Washington. It's like one loophole after another.”
Congress, the banking lobby. Violates: Consent of the governed. Source: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R.4173, 111th Congress (2010), Congress.gov
2012
2012
Three years after the bailouts, the FRONTLINE series on the crisis closed with the people who took part in it saying that too big to fail had been made permanent, that risky investments and derivatives had not been fixed, and that the crisis had not ended.
“In many respects, the financial crisis never ended. It never ended.”
The financial system as rebuilt after 2008. Violates: None in law. Listed for what it means going forward.. Source: Money, Power and Wall Street, Part Three, FRONTLINE (PBS)

Timeline Events (1)

Dated events from this investigation in the site timeline.

May 7, 2009
Stress tests find the 19 largest banks sound
The financial sector returned to profitability soon after. It was one of the few sectors that did, and the bailouts became a source of public anger from both the left and the right.
Obama, Timothy Geithner, and the 2009 Decision Not to Break Up the Big Banks | Spirit of '76