2001 to 2012: After September 11 · Wall Street & Banking
Obama, Timothy Geithner, and the 2009 Decision Not to Break Up the Big Banks
Period covered: November 2008 to July 2010 · 2 sources
Summary
In 2009 President Obama had to choose between breaking up the banks that caused the crisis and nursing them back to health. He chose Timothy Geithner's plan. On March 27 he told thirteen bank chief executives he was all that stood between them and the pitchforks, then offered to help. Records later pried loose by Bloomberg showed the banks had borrowed $1.2 trillion from the Federal Reserve in a single day.
When the Obama administration took office in January 2009, the financial system was still in free fall. The country had lost 650,000 jobs in the three months before the inauguration. The stock market was down more than 6,000 points. Citigroup was failing during the transition and the outgoing Treasury put another $20 billion into it. One interviewee described the period as one in which nobody was in charge.
Who would run it
Obama had campaigned with a group of reform minded economists around him: Robert Reich, Joseph Stiglitz, and Paul Volcker, the former Fed chairman who wanted the banks regulated and was feared on Wall Street. The film frames the choice in front of the new president as one between reforming Wall Street and rebuilding it. For treasury secretary Obama chose Timothy Geithner, the president of the New York Fed, who had led the Bush administration's response, engineered the Bear Stearns rescue, gone along with letting Lehman fail, and pushed the AIG bailout. One interviewee said Geithner was a protege of Robert Rubin and therefore of and from Wall Street, and would see the economy the way Wall Street sees it. For chief economic adviser Obama chose Larry Summers, Clinton's last treasury secretary, who had since made millions at a hedge fund. Obama was told the choice would look like bringing in the same plumbers who caused the leak. His team's answer was that there was no time for anyone who did not already know the job.
The stress tests
Geithner arrived at a Treasury whose website listed position after position as vacant. On February 9, 2009, the president announced that his secretary would present the plan the next day. The speech was rewritten overnight after Summers said the draft sounded amateurish. Geithner, who had never given a national press conference or appeared on television, read it from two teleprompters, and the Dow fell nearly 400 points while he spoke. The plan was a stress test: the government would examine the books of the largest banks, publish what it found, and put capital into the ones that needed it. The bet was that if the markets could be convinced the hole was smaller than feared, confidence would return on its own. Within three weeks Washington was asking whether Geithner would be the first to go. In the Oval Office he defended the plan without flinching, and the president kept him.
The argument inside the White House
In Congress, the heads of the banks were lined up at a hearing and, in one witness's words, given a public whipping. Ken Lewis of Bank of America, whose bank had taken more than $45 billion, said he went in knowing that was the point. At the White House, David Axelrod, Robert Gibbs, and Summers wanted a scalp, and the talk turned to firing Lewis. A member of Congress asked why the British government could take over the Royal Bank of Scotland and fire its chief executive, and the American government could fire the head of a car company, but not the head of a bank. Geithner argued against it. He called it Old Testament justice and said it would frighten off the private investors the banks needed. His rule, borrowed from medicine, was first do no harm.
Summers wanted more. He believed the losses ran to trillions, that the system was broken, and that the government should take over and restructure at least one of the too big to fail banks, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, or Bank of America, to show Wall Street that gambling with the country's fortune and losing has consequences. Christina Romer agreed with him. Geithner said taking over a bank was like pushing a boulder down a hill without knowing whether you could stop it. On March 15, 2009 the president put the two of them through a six hour argument. Critics inside and outside the administration said the stress tests were a confidence game and that a stress test can be cooked to produce the result you want. Summers called the plan watchful waiting. Geithner said it was real action and made the case point by point. The president kept his own counsel.
March 27
Two weeks later thirteen bankers were called to the White House. They had been told the president would vent the public's anger. They feared a ban on too big to fail, limits on pay, and a requirement to refinance the mortgages of homeowners who owed more than their houses were worth. One witness said they had not been that nervous since nursery school.
The president spoke first and told them that his administration was the only thing between them and the pitchforks. Then, according to the account in the documentary, he pulled back as fast as he could. He told them that what they had was a public relations disaster turning into a political disaster, and that he was there to help. He asked for no commitments. Lewis took it as a turning point, a signal that the banks were the way out of the mess and the past could be put aside. The bankers went out to the cameras and said they were all in it together. One interviewee called it an opportunity lost: a room full of frightened chief executives, a president in a position to make demands, and no demands made. Another asked how the government could bail out the banks with no strings attached when everyone on Main Street who managed to get a loan got it with strings.
What was not known
The bankers in that room had already received more than $180 billion from the federal government with almost no conditions. What nobody outside knew was that they had also been borrowing from the Federal Reserve on a scale that came out only after Bloomberg News fought for the records all the way to the Supreme Court. On the peak day, December 5, 2008, the banks had $1.2 trillion in Fed loans outstanding. Morgan Stanley alone had $107 billion out on a single day, Citigroup more than $99 billion, Bank of America $91 billion. In all, the Fed made available more than $7.7 trillion in loans, commitments, and guarantees to financial institutions around the world, including foreign banks.
In May 2009 the stress tests found all 19 of the largest banks fundamentally healthy. Geithner took the results to the president. The banks reported large profits that spring. One of the president's economic advisers said later that the plan was effective, that the financial sector was highly profitable again, and that the problem was that it was about the only sector that was.
Reform
By August 2009 the Tea Party was holding rallies in all fifty states, angry above all about the bailouts, and much of the anger was aimed at the president. Rahm Emanuel, the chief of staff, told the president the moment for Old Testament justice had come. On the first anniversary of Lehman's failure Obama went to Federal Hall, steps from the stock exchange, to call for reform. Jamie Dimon, Lloyd Blankfein, and the other heads of the large banks did not attend. None of them had been fired or prosecuted.
The White House then spent its energy on health care, and reform of the banks was left to Congress in 2010, by which time the banks had recovered and could afford to fight. Interviewees in the documentary describe armies of lobbyists, the best money could hire, paid with money the government had put into the banks, working to weaken the bill loophole by loophole. The proposals to break up the too big to fail banks were kept out. On July 21, 2010 the president signed Dodd-Frank and said there would be no more tax funded bailouts, period. A member of his own administration said the bill left so much undecided that the important decisions were still being made out of public view, where the lobbyists could reach them, and worried that the lessons of the crash had not been learned.
The film ends with three judgments. Too big to fail has been institutionalized, and the next crisis could be larger. The three things that had to be fixed, too big to fail, risky investments, and derivatives, were not fixed. And the crisis never ended. People think of a run up to September 2008, a bailout, and an end. The clouds are still over the global economy and they are still full of risk.
Primary Sources (2)
Documents, court filings, official reports, and broadcasts cited in this report.
Documented Records (6)
Chronological entries extracted from the primary sources above.
Timeline Events (1)
Dated events from this investigation in the site timeline.
More in Wall Street & Banking
View all stories in Wall Street & Banking → · Topic overview →
- 2013 to 2026Why European Central Banks Are Pulling Their Gold Reserves Out of the New York FedOn September 2, 2026 the Dutch central bank said it had moved about 86 tonnes of its gold out of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Bank of Canada to London between March and August, in view of increasing geopolitical unrest, so that the gold could be sold quickly in a crisis. France's central bank had already sold the last 129 tonnes it kept in New York and bought replacement bars in Europe. Germany, which keeps 1,236 tonnes in New York, is being pressed by its own economists and politicians to bring it home. The New York vault held over 12,000 tonnes of other countries' gold in 1973 and 6,331 tonnes in 2024. The countries that kept their gold in Manhattan because they trusted the United States are, one by one, deciding they would rather have it somewhere else.Wall Street & Banking
- February 2025 to July 2026The 2025–2026 Emergency Tariffs: $160 Billion Collected Before the Supreme Court Struck Them DownIn 2025 the president imposed tariffs on nearly every country under a 1977 emergency law that does not mention tariffs. By October the average tariff rate on what Americans buy from abroad was 17.9 percent, the highest since 1934, and the Budget Lab at Yale put the cost at $1,800 a household. Customs duties paid at the border rose 153 percent to $195 billion in fiscal 2025. On February 20, 2026 the Supreme Court held 6 to 3 that the law gave the president no such power. About $160 billion had been collected by then. Four days later a 10 percent tariff on everyone went on under a different law; a trade court struck that one in May; when it expired in July it was replaced under a third law, at 10 to 12.5 percent, on 60 countries.Wall Street & Banking
- 1945 to 2024How BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Vote Your 401(k) SharesBlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street hold a stake in nearly every listed company, paid for with pension and 401(k) money. The people whose money it is sign away their votes, the asset managers almost always vote with management, and the managers decide for themselves whether they count as passive investors.Wall Street & Banking
- 2020 to 2024Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Trading Millions in Stocks and Bonds During the 2020 BailoutsIn 2020 the Federal Reserve decided what the markets would do, and two of the twelve regional bank presidents who sat in on those decisions were trading in the markets. The president of the Dallas Fed traded stocks and options in positions worth millions. The president of the Boston Fed bought into mortgage funds in the months the Fed was buying mortgage bonds. Both announced their departures in September 2021. The Fed's inspector general found in January 2024 that neither had broken the rules in force, that the rules did not sufficiently support public confidence, and that both had created the appearance of a conflict of interest. In September 2024 he found the Atlanta Fed president had broken the trading rules and created the appearance of acting on confidential information. He stayed in office.Wall Street & Banking
- 2018 to 2026The 2023 Silicon Valley Bank Bailout and the $3 Trillion Unregulated Private Credit MarketIn March 2023 Silicon Valley Bank lost $40 billion of deposits in a day and expected $100 billion more the next morning. The government invoked an emergency exception to guarantee every deposit, including the $231 billion at two banks that the law did not insure, at a cost of $16.7 billion charged to 110 other banks. The Federal Reserve's own review found that the 2018 law rolling back the rules for banks of that size had reduced the standards, increased complexity, and promoted a less assertive supervisory approach. Since then the lending that used to be done by regulated banks has moved to private credit funds, now about $3 trillion, where two large borrowers collapsed in 2025 after hiding their debts and the funds began capping withdrawals.Wall Street & Banking