2001 to 2012: After September 11 · CIA, War & Covert Operations

What Official Senate and Inspector General Reports Found on the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

Period covered: 2002 to 2021 · 6 sources

Summary

Congress authorized the invasion of Iraq in October 2002 by votes of 296 to 133 and 77 to 23. In October 2004 the government's own weapons inspectors reported that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction and had not had any since the 1990s. In June 2008 the Senate Intelligence Committee found, 10 to 5, that the administration's statements about Iraq's weapons and its ties to al Qaeda were not supported by the intelligence, and its chairman said the nation had been led into war under false pretenses. In August 2021 the inspector general for Afghanistan reported that after $145 billion in reconstruction and $837 billion in war spending the government had never understood the country, and quoted the general who oversaw the war from the White House under two presidents: we didn't know what we were doing. Brown University's count of the dead from direct violence in the wars that followed September 11 is more than 940,000, of whom more than 432,000 were civilians.

Three days after September 11, 2001 Congress authorized force against those responsible, 98 to 0 in the Senate and 420 to 1 in the House. On October 10 and 11, 2002 it authorized the president to use force against Iraq, 296 to 133 in the House and 77 to 23 in the Senate. The case made to Congress and the public was that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and was working with al Qaeda. The invasion began in March 2003.

The weapons

The Iraq Survey Group was the government's own search for the weapons. Its head, Charles Duelfer, reported to the Senate on October 6, 2004. Iraq, he found, had no weapons of mass destruction and no immediate capability to produce them at the time of the invasion. Its programs had been destroyed by the mid 1990s, and between 1991 and 2003 its government had chosen not to keep militarily significant stockpiles because its first aim was to get the United Nations sanctions lifted. Saddam Hussein had wanted the world to believe he had more than he did, and had intended to restart the programs once the sanctions ended. Duelfer said the analysts before the war had lacked ground truth, because the government had few sources inside the country.

The Senate's finding

On June 5, 2008 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released the last of its reports on the intelligence before the war, by a vote of 10 to 5. The committee found that the administration's statements that Iraq and al Qaeda had a partnership, and that Iraq had trained al Qaeda in weapons, were not substantiated by the intelligence. Statements that Saddam Hussein would give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups were contradicted by the available intelligence. Statements before October 2002 about Iraq's ability to produce chemical weapons did not reflect the uncertainty inside the intelligence community. The secretary of defense's claims about underground weapons facilities had no substantiation. The vice president's repeated claim that the hijacker Mohamed Atta had met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague had never been confirmed. The administration's descriptions of what would happen in Iraq after the war did not reflect the concerns the intelligence agencies had raised. The chairman, Jay Rockefeller, said the administration made significant claims that were not supported by the intelligence, that the American people were led to believe that the threat from Iraq was much greater than actually existed, and that the nation had been led into war under false pretenses.

Afghanistan

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction was created by Congress in 2008 to audit the money. In August 2021, as the government the United States had spent twenty years building fell, the inspector general published a report titled What We Need to Learn. The United States, it said, had spent $145 billion on reconstruction and $837 billion on the war. It counted 2,443 American troops killed and 20,666 wounded, 1,144 allied troops killed, more than 66,000 Afghan troops killed, and more than 48,000 Afghan civilians killed and more than 75,000 injured. Its lessons were that the government never had a coherent strategy, that it set timelines that rewarded spending money fast over spending it well, that it built institutions and projects the Afghan government could not keep running, that it never had enough trained people and the ones it had kept turning over, that it never understood the country, and that it never had a way to measure whether any of it worked. The effort, it said, amounted to 20 one-year reconstruction efforts instead of one 20-year effort. It quoted Douglas Lute, the general who oversaw the war from the White House under two presidents: we were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan. We didn't know what we were doing.

The Official Count

The Costs of War project at Brown University keeps the count that the government does not. Its estimate is that more than 940,000 people were killed by direct violence in the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Pakistan between 2001 and 2023, more than 432,000 of them civilians, and that 3.6 to 3.8 million more died from the wars' indirect effects, for a total of at least 4.5 to 4.7 million. Its estimate of what the United States had spent and requested in reaction to the attacks through 2021 is $5.8 trillion, and it projects that the care of the veterans of these wars will cost between $2.2 and $2.5 trillion by 2050, most of it not yet paid.

← 2001 to 2012

Primary Sources (6)

Documents, court filings, official reports, and broadcasts cited in this report.

Congressional Research Service. The 2001 and 2002 authorizations and their votes; eleven formal declarations of war, the last in 1942.
Watson Institute, Brown University. About $5.8 trillion spent and requested through 2021; $2.2 to $2.5 trillion for veterans' care by 2050.
Watson Institute, Brown University. More than 940,000 killed by direct violence 2001 to 2023, more than 432,000 civilians; 3.6 to 3.8 million indirect deaths.
2004
PBS NewsHour. Duelfer's report: no weapons or immediate production capability at the invasion; programs destroyed by the mid 1990s; the intent to restart after sanctions.
2008
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 10 to 5. Statements not substantiated, contradicted, or unconfirmed by the intelligence. Rockefeller: led the nation into war under false pretenses.
2021
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. $145 billion and $837 billion; the casualty counts; the seven lessons; 20 one-year efforts; Lute: we didn't know what we were doing.

Documented Records (1)

Chronological entries extracted from the primary sources above.

2008
October 2002 to August 2021
The government's own inspectors found no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The Senate Intelligence Committee found 10 to 5 that the statements that took the country to war were not supported by the intelligence, and its chairman said the nation was led into war under false pretenses. The inspector general for Afghanistan found that $145 billion in reconstruction and $837 billion in war spending were run by a government that did not understand the country. Brown University counts more than 940,000 dead by direct violence in the wars after 2001, more than 432,000 of them civilians.
“The American people were led to believe that the threat from Iraq was much greater than actually existed.”
The administration of George W. Bush; the Congress that authorized the war; the four administrations that ran the Afghanistan war. Violates: The government's duty to tell the public the truth. No one charged.. Source: Senate Intelligence Committee Unveils Final Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Timeline Events (4)

Dated events from this investigation in the site timeline.

August 2021
SIGAR: we didn't know what we were doing
$145 billion in reconstruction, $837 billion in war; 2,443 American troops dead.
June 5, 2008
Senate Intelligence Committee: the nation was led into war under false pretenses
10 to 5. Statements not substantiated, contradicted, or never confirmed.
October 6, 2004
Iraq Survey Group: no weapons of mass destruction
The programs had been destroyed by the mid 1990s.
October 10 and 11, 2002
Congress authorizes war on Iraq, 296 to 133 and 77 to 23
On statements the Senate later found unsupported by the intelligence.
What Official Senate and Inspector General Reports Found on the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars | Spirit of '76