1975 to 2000: Investigations and deregulation · CIA, War & Covert Operations
What the CIA Knew About Two 9/11 Hijackers Before the Attacks—and Hid from the FBI
Period covered: 2000 to 2025 · 4 sources
Summary
In January 2000 the CIA knew that Khalid al-Mihdhar, an al-Qaeda operative on his way to a meeting in Malaysia, held a visa to enter the United States. An FBI agent assigned to the CIA's bin Laden unit drafted a report to tell his own agency and was told not to send it. Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi lived openly in San Diego for more than a year. A former FBI agent assigned to the unit says the agency was trying to recruit them. The public record shows what was withheld; the reason is still disputed.
The first episode of The 9/11 Files, a five part series from Tucker Carlson's network, opens with the claim that the official account of the attacks is a lie and that the series will make the case for a new investigation. It rests mainly on one witness, Mark Rossini, a former FBI agent who from January 1999 to May 2003 was the New York Joint Terrorism Task Force's representative at Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit.
What the record shows
After the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa, the FBI learned, from a captured participant, the number of a house in Sanaa, Yemen that al-Qaeda used as a switchboard. The CIA and NSA had been listening to it. The house belonged to the father in law of Khalid al-Mihdhar. Around the turn of 2000 the NSA learned Mihdhar would travel to a meeting in Kuala Lumpur. The CIA had his passport photographed during a stop in Dubai, and it showed a multiple entry visa for the United States issued at the consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The 9/11 Commission's report describes the Kuala Lumpur meeting, the CIA's surveillance of it, and the visa, and it records that the information was not passed to the FBI and that neither man was put on the State Department's watch list until August 2001. Mihdhar and Hazmi flew to Los Angeles on January 15, 2000, lived in San Diego under their real names, and Hazmi was in the phone book. Mihdhar left in June 2000, came back on July 4, 2001, and was not stopped. In June 2001, at a meeting in New York about the bombing of the USS Cole, an FBI agent was shown a photograph of Mihdhar from the Malaysia meeting and asked who he was, and the CIA did not say. The commission's report calls this a failure to share and attributes it to the way the two agencies worked.
Rossini's account of the failure is specific. His colleague at Alec Station, FBI agent Doug Miller, drafted a Central Intelligence Report to tell the FBI about Mihdhar's visa. Rossini approved it. It went to the queue of a CIA officer and sat there, and when Rossini asked, he says, she told him it was not an FBI matter, that the CIA would tell the FBI when and if it wanted to, and that he was not to say anything. He believed her, he says, and lives with that. The CIA inspector general's own review of the agency's performance before the attacks, completed in 2005, found that the visa information was in cables that some fifty to sixty agency employees read and that it was not passed on.
The 28 pages of the congressional Joint Inquiry's report that dealt with Saudi support for the hijackers were withheld by the Bush administration when the report was published in 2002 and declassified on July 15, 2016. They describe Omar al-Bayoumi, who met the two men at a restaurant in Los Angeles, helped them find an apartment in San Diego, co-signed the lease, and paid their first month's rent, as a man the FBI's files said may have been a Saudi intelligence officer, with a no show job at a Saudi aviation contractor and money reaching him from Saudi sources. On August 28, 2025, in the lawsuit the victims' families brought against Saudi Arabia, Judge George Daniels of the Southern District of New York denied the kingdom's motion to dismiss. He found a reasonable inference that Bayoumi and Fahad al-Thumairy, an imam and consular employee, were acting within the scope of Saudi employment when they helped the hijackers, and he cited a sketch of an airplane with numbers and calculations found among Bayoumi's belongings in Britain as evidence that facially connects him with knowledge of the attacks. The case goes to trial on liability.
What the series claims
The series' argument is that the CIA withheld the information because it was running an operation to recruit the two men as sources inside al-Qaeda, using Saudi intelligence and Bayoumi as its proxy because the agency could not operate inside the country, and that the operation went wrong. Its evidence is a filing in the families' lawsuit quoting Richard Clarke, the White House counterterrorism coordinator, as telling investigators that the CIA was running a false flag operation to recruit the hijackers, and a second FBI agent quoted in the same filing as believing the agency's operation may have spun out of control. George Tenet, the CIA director at the time, told the series through a spokesman that it was categorically not true. The series also says the commission's staff was blocked from interviewing the CIA officers involved, that its executive director, Philip Zelikow, limited witnesses and screened records through the White House, and that a senior counsel tried to remove the Saudi material days before publication. It says the visas were issued at the Jeddah consulate while John Brennan, later CIA director, was the agency's station chief in Saudi Arabia, and that a court filing describes the visas as issued to facilitate a Saudi and CIA operation. Brennan was chief of station in Riyadh in the late 1990s; the rest is the filing's claim and the series' inference.
The series also records the FBI's own failures: the informant in San Diego whose house the two men lived in, the Phoenix memo about flight schools that headquarters never saw, the Moussaoui laptop agents were not allowed to search, a bureau that in 2001 could not search its own case files or send email, and that mailed photographs of the hijackers by express mail after the attacks because it had no scanners.
Primary Sources (4)
Documents, court filings, official reports, and broadcasts cited in this report.
Documented Records (3)
Chronological entries extracted from the primary sources above.
Timeline Events (4)
Dated events from this investigation in the site timeline.
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