1945 to 1974: Secret programs · CIA, War & Covert Operations

The 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Incident: How the NSA Faked the Pretext for the Vietnam War

Period covered: 1964 to 2005 · 4 sources

Summary

On August 4, 1964 the government told the country that North Vietnamese boats had attacked two American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Three days later Congress passed a resolution, 416 to 0 in the House and 88 to 2 in the Senate, authorizing the president to take all necessary measures. The National Security Agency's own historian concluded that no attack happened that night, that about 90 percent of the intercepts were left out of the reports sent to the White House, and that what remained was presented so as to fit the claim. The agency kept his study secret until 2005 because officials feared comparisons with Iraq. 58,220 Americans died in the war.

On August 2, 1964 the destroyer USS Maddox, on an intelligence patrol off the coast of North Vietnam, was attacked by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats. That attack happened. On the night of August 4 the Maddox and a second destroyer, the Turner Joy, reported that they were under attack again. Within hours the president announced the second attack on television and ordered air strikes on North Vietnam. On August 7 Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which approved and supported the determination of the president, as commander in chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. The House vote was 416 to 0. In the Senate only Wayne Morse of Oregon and Ernest Gruening of Alaska voted no. The president signed it on August 10. It was the legal basis for the Vietnam War for more than six years.

The Declassified NSA History

The National Security Agency intercepted North Vietnamese naval communications throughout, and its reports were what Washington relied on that night. In 2001 an agency historian named Robert Hanyok published a study of those intercepts in the agency's classified journal, Cryptologic Quarterly, under the title Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish. He examined 122 signals intelligence products from the period that had never been available to outside researchers.

His conclusion was that no attack happened that night. In his words, Hanoi's navy was engaged in nothing that night but the salvage of two of the boats damaged on August 2. The reports of torpedoes and gunfire from the destroyers came from radar and sonar in bad weather and from crews who expected an attack. The intercepts the agency held showed the North Vietnamese boats doing something else.

The intelligence was not merely wrong. Hanyok found that nearly 90 percent of the relevant intercepts were left out of the summaries the agency sent to policymakers after the incident and out of its final report in October 1964. Fragments of real intercepts, some of them about the August 2 attack, were lifted from their context and placed in the summaries in a way that supported the claim of a second attack, and two separate North Vietnamese messages were combined into a single translation. His finding, in the study's words, was that the signals intelligence was presented in such a manner as to preclude responsible decisionmakers in the Johnson administration from having the complete and objective narrative. The overwhelming body of reports, if used, would have told the story that no attack occurred.

Kept secret

The study was classified. A researcher named Matthew Aid requested it under the Freedom of Information Act in April 2004. In October 2005 the New York Times reported that the agency was holding it back, and that officials feared its release might prompt uncomfortable comparisons with the flawed intelligence used to justify the war in Iraq. At the end of November 2005 the agency released the study and more than 140 other documents, including the intercepts, the chronologies, and oral histories. The finding that there was no second attack on August 4, 1964 became the government's own, forty one years after the vote.

The cost

The National Archives' record of the war's dead lists 58,220 members of the American armed forces, most of them killed between 1965 and 1972, with 16,899 in 1968 alone. Congress repealed the resolution in January 1971, and in 1973 passed the War Powers Resolution over a veto, requiring a president to report to Congress within 48 hours of committing forces and to withdraw them within 60 days without authorization. Since then, presidents of both parties have repeatedly committed military forces without a declaration of war.

← 1945 to 1974

Primary Sources (4)

Documents, court filings, official reports, and broadcasts cited in this report.

National Archives. 58,220 fatal casualties; 16,899 in 1968.
1964
National Archives, Milestone Documents. The text, the two dissenting senators, the January 1971 repeal.
2001
National Security Agency, Cryptologic Quarterly (Naval History and Heritage Command copy). Robert Hanyok's study: no attack on August 4; about 90 percent of the intercepts withheld from the summaries; intelligence presented so as to preclude a complete and objective narrative.
2005
National Security Archive, via History News Network. The release of more than 140 documents, the 2004 FOIA request, and the New York Times report that officials feared comparisons with Iraq.

Documented Records (2)

Chronological entries extracted from the primary sources above.

1964
August 4 to 10, 1964
The president announced a second North Vietnamese attack on American destroyers and ordered air strikes. Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on August 7, 416 to 0 in the House and 88 to 2 in the Senate, approving all necessary measures to repel armed attack and prevent further aggression. The NSA's own historian later found that no attack happened that night, that nearly 90 percent of the relevant intercepts were withheld from the summaries sent to policymakers, and that what was sent was presented so as to fit the claim. 58,220 Americans died in the war.
“SIGINT information was presented in such a manner as to preclude responsible decisionmakers in the Johnson administration from having the complete and objective narrative.”
President Lyndon Johnson; Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; National Security Agency; Congress. Violates: Article I war power, exercised on a false report.. Source: Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964, National Security Agency, Cryptologic Quarterly (Naval History and Heritage Command copy)
2005
2001 to November 2005
The NSA classified its historian's 2001 study finding there was no attack, refused a 2004 Freedom of Information Act request, and, according to the New York Times, held it because officials feared comparisons with the intelligence used to justify the Iraq war. It released the study and more than 140 related documents at the end of November 2005.
National Security Agency. Violates: None in law. Listed for the four years the finding was withheld.. Source: Tonkin Gulf Intelligence Skewed, New Documents Reveal, National Security Archive, via History News Network

Timeline Events (2)

Dated events from this investigation in the site timeline.

November 30, 2005
NSA releases its historian's finding that the second Tonkin attack never happened
Held for four years; officials feared comparisons with Iraq.
August 7, 1964
Tonkin Gulf Resolution passes 416 to 0 and 88 to 2
Authorizes all necessary measures on the report of an attack the NSA's historian later found did not happen.
The 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Incident: How the NSA Faked the Pretext for the Vietnam War | Spirit of '76