2013 to 2019: The disclosures · CIA, War & Covert Operations

The 2014 Senate Torture Report: CIA Black Sites, Waterboarding, and Zero Prosecutions

Period covered: 2002 to 2014 · 2 sources

Summary

In December 2014 the Senate Intelligence Committee published the findings of its five year study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program. The agency held at least 119 people in secret prisons, 26 of whom by its own standard should not have been held, and used what it called enhanced interrogation techniques on 39 of them. One died of hypothermia. The committee found the techniques were not an effective means of acquiring intelligence, that the interrogations were brutal and far worse than the CIA represented, and that the agency repeatedly gave inaccurate information to the Justice Department, the White House, Congress, its own inspector general, and the press. The Justice Department had closed its investigation in 2012 without a charge. The one CIA officer who went to prison in connection with the program was the one who had spoken about it publicly, convicted of giving a reporter the name of a colleague.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence published its findings and conclusions on December 9, 2014. There are twenty. The first is that the CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees. The second is that the agency's justification for the techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness. The third is that the interrogations were brutal and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers and others. The fourth is that the conditions of confinement were harsher than the CIA had represented. The fifth through tenth are about what the agency told the people who were supposed to control it: it repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice, impeding a proper legal analysis; it actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight; it impeded effective White House oversight and decision-making; it complicated the national security missions of other agencies; it impeded oversight by its own inspector general; and it coordinated the release of classified information to the media, including inaccurate information about the program's effectiveness. The rest are about the agency itself: it was unprepared when it began holding prisoners; the management of the program was deeply flawed throughout; two contract psychologists devised the techniques and were later paid to help run the program; detainees were subjected to techniques that had not been approved; and the agency never made a comprehensive accounting of the people it held.

Scale and Figures

The committee counted at least 119 people held in the program. At least 26 of them did not meet the agency's own standard for detention. Thirty-nine were subjected to the techniques. One, at the site the report calls COBALT, died of hypothermia. The techniques, as the report describes them from the agency's own records, included waterboarding, sleep deprivation, confinement in boxes, and being kept naked and chained.

What the government did about it

On August 30, 2012, before the committee's report was finished, the attorney general announced the closure of the criminal investigations into the death of two individuals while in United States custody at overseas locations. The prosecutor assigned to the matter had reviewed the cases of 101 detainees and in June 2011 recommended full investigations of only the two deaths. Of those, he found that the admissible evidence would not be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. No one was charged with anything. The committee's full report, more than 6,000 pages, remains classified; the public has the 500 page summary. The only CIA officer imprisoned in connection with the interrogation program was whistleblower John Kiriakou, who confirmed on television in 2007 that waterboarding was official policy.

← 2013 to 2019

Primary Sources (2)

Documents, court filings, official reports, and broadcasts cited in this report.

2012
U.S. Department of Justice. 101 detainee cases reviewed; two deaths investigated; the admissible evidence would not be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction; no charges.
2014
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The twenty findings; 119 detainees, 26 wrongfully held, 39 subjected to the techniques, one death from hypothermia at COBALT.

Documented Records (1)

Chronological entries extracted from the primary sources above.

2014
2002 to 2014
The CIA held at least 119 people in secret prisons, 26 of them without meeting its own standard, used its enhanced interrogation techniques on 39, and lost one to hypothermia. The Senate Intelligence Committee found the techniques not effective, the interrogations brutal and far worse than the CIA represented, and the agency repeatedly providing inaccurate information to the Justice Department, the White House, Congress, its inspector general, and the press. The Justice Department closed its investigation in 2012 with no charge.
“The CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees.”
Central Intelligence Agency; Department of Justice. Violates: Eighth Amendment; the federal torture statute. No charge.. Source: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program: Findings and Conclusions, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Timeline Events (2)

Dated events from this investigation in the site timeline.

December 9, 2014
Senate: CIA interrogations brutal, ineffective, and misrepresented to everyone
119 held, 26 wrongfully; one dead of hypothermia.
August 30, 2012
Justice Department closes the CIA interrogation investigations with no charge
101 cases reviewed; two deaths investigated; evidence found insufficient.
The 2014 Senate Torture Report: CIA Black Sites, Waterboarding, and Zero Prosecutions | Spirit of '76